Shame and bankruptcy : the numbers of Americans filing for bankruptcy protection has surged fivefold in two decades. A Richmond Fed economist challenges the conventional wisdom that declining stigma is at the root of the increase by Doug Campbell
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T
he narrative sounds convinc-
ing: Crazed consumers, their
wallets stuffed with maxed-
out credit cards, rack up unseemly
sums of debt and then shamelessly
unload it all in bankruptcy court.
Back in the good ol’ days — say, the
1920s, 1950s or even 1980s — this
never would have happened, the con-
ventional wisdom goes. Americans
had integrity. They certainly wouldn’t
bail themselves out by the million
with bankruptcy protection. Their
reputations were too important. That
was then. Nowadays, with bankruptcy
increasingly commonplace, the stigma
has faded. It’s an embarrassment of
riches in reverse.
How else to explain skyrocketing
bankruptcy rates? Consider the case of
the 1990s. Personal bankruptcy filings
surged 35 percent to more than 1.4 mil-
lion a year in 1997 from 924,000 in
1991. The median total of unsecured
debt borrowers discharged in bank-
ruptcy in 1981 was $12,452. By 1997, it
had soared more than 50 percent to
$19,515. The pace of filings was eight
times higher than population growth.
(Business bankruptcies account for
less than 3 percent of total filings.)
That unemployment was low, the
stock market rising, and the economy
generally humming as bankruptcy fil-
ings accelerated left analysts reaching
for answers. The stigma rationalization
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“At one time in our history, 
filing bankruptcy was regarded as 
shameful, and filers suffered social stigma
and permanently ruined credit. The shame
and stigma are no longer compelling.”
— The Hon. Edith Jones, 
former member of the National Bankruptcy
Review Commission, 
March 1999
“Stigma is by no means dead.”
— Kartik Athreya, economist, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond, 2004
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was as expedient as it was convenient.
It  squared with the gut feeling 
of many Americans that moral stan-
dards were falling. Credit cards had
indeed become widely available, but
why were so many people using their 
plastic with reckless abandon?
The trend continued into this 
century. In 2003, more than 1.6 
million people filed for bankruptcy
protection. By comparison, in 1983
only 286,444 Americans went bank-
rupt. About seven out of 10 debtors
file under Chapter 7 bankruptcy 
protection, in which all their unse-
cured debts are erased. Chapter 7 fil-
ings account for $36.4 billion of the
total $40 billion discharged each year
in bankruptcy. Most of the rest comes
in the form of Chapter 13 bankrupt-
cies, in which payments for secured
debts are rescheduled but still result in
the discharge of most unsecured debt.
The Conventional Wisdom
The “declining stigma is the root of
bankruptcy” way of thinking has
gained currency. The winter 1999 issue
of Harvard Magazine chimed in with 
a typical hand-wringing account:
“Credit industry analysts hold that the
stigma of bankruptcy has traditionally
kept people honest about their ability
to  pay debts. Earlier generations of
debtors lashed themselves to austerity
budgets, sold off possessions, and
worked extra shifts to avoid the shame
of defaulting. But today, says the
industry, many debtors have chosen to
see bankruptcy as a convenient loop-
hole against collections.” 
Towson University economist
Joseph Pomykala, in a 1999 article,
offered up a virtual bankruptcy hall of
shame: a doctor who filed for bank-
ruptcy immediately after charging a
$60,000 European vacation on his
American Express card; a waiter who
accumulated $170,500 in debt over
just six months for items including a
gambling trip to Atlantic City.
Funny thing is, this is old news.
For decades, preachers, politicians,
and ethicists of all stripes have railed 
about the decay of fiscal virtue.
Economists Bradley Hansen of the
University of Mary Washington and
Mary  Eschelbach Hansen of
American University note in a recent
paper that worries about declines in
stigma were shared by credit experts
in the 1920s. The difference in the
1990s was the seemingly persuasive
combination of shame and fast-
increasing bankruptcy cases. The
bankruptcy-and-shame theory offi-
cially entered the zeitgeist.
Intangibles like stigma aren’t usual-
ly fodder for number-crunchers. But it
wasn’t long before economists began
weighing in, albeit at first indirectly.
David Gross of Lexecon Inc. and
Nicholas Souleles of the University of
Pennsylvania seized on a “demand-
effect” explanation for escalating
bankruptcy. People have become
more willing to default over time in
part because the costs of default, in-
cluding nonmonetary costs like social
stigma, have declined. Our work “is
suggestive of a decline in social stigma
or information costs, but it is not con-
clusive,” they wrote in an article pub-
lished in the spring 2002 issue of the
Review of Financial Studies. 
Economists Michelle White of the
University of California at San Diego,
Erik Hurst of the University of
Chicago, and Scott Fay of the
University of Florida took that case to
another level. White has long held that
— shame aside — we should expect
more people to file for bankruptcy
because it is financially advantageous
to do so. By her tally about 15 percent
of U.S. households could gain from
bankruptcy protection but less than 10
percent of those same households —
and only a tiny fraction of all U.S.
households — actually do. In their
widely cited 2002 American Economic
Review article, “The Household
Bankruptcy Decision,” White, Fay and
Hurst backed the “strategic model” of
bankruptcy, which predicts that peo-
ple file for protection not so much
because of adverse events but because
they see financial benefit.
White’s team took a stab at 
testing the bankruptcy-stigma theory.
Basically, they found that people were
more likely to file for bankruptcy
when they lived in a district that had
a higher filing rate relative to popula-
tion. They argued that people are
more likely to learn about bankruptcy
from friends and family and to decide
that bankruptcy is, by extension,
socially acceptable if they live in a
district with a higher filing rate. In an
interview, White elaborates: “You get
a subliminal message that it’s not 
stigmatized.”
So the issue seems largely settled:
Bankruptcy is being accelerated by
declining stigma. Well, not so fast. The
debate over stigma’s role in bankruptcy
is very much alive, and the implications
for how it’s resolved are important.
The Challenge
Steering stigma-and-bankruptcy re-
search in a new direction is Kartik
Athreya, an economist with the Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond. His work
leads him to conclude that it’s “shame
as it ever was,” to borrow from the title
of one of his recent papers. 
Athreya says that bankruptcy rates
are climbing because it’s much cheaper
for creditors to make loans. As a result,
riskier borrowers are eligible to accu-
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Consumer Filings
The steep climb in U.S. consumer bankruptcy 
filings (which also happened in the Fifth District)
during the 1980s and 1990s led many to believe
that people no longer felt shame in seeking court
protection from paying their debts. A Richmond
Fed economist attributes the rise to cheaper lend-
ing costs incurred by creditors.
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mulate levels of debt that in previous
decades would have been unheard of.
“If stigma really went down, it’s hard
for me to understand creditors making
loans on the favorable terms they’ve
been making them,” Athreya says.
“Declining stigma should have some
impact on the cost of credit.”
Athreya is a relative newcomer 
to  the shame-and-bankruptcy fray.
Stumped for a dissertation topic in
1997 he took a year off from his gradu-
ate studies at the University of Iowa to
work for Citibank’s credit card unit.
One of his jobs was to figure 
out how much default the company
should view as a simple cost of doing
business, and how much ought to be
either recovered or prevented from
happening in the first place by not
extending credit to risky consumers.
Athreya headed back to campus the
next fall with a fresh focus. Citibank
had a specific business problem. What
intrigued him was the wider role that
bankruptcy played as an American
institution. Was bankruptcy good for
the country?
“Bankruptcy has always been
talked about in terms of providing a
kind of insurance or backstop against
misfortune for honest people,” Athreya
says. “It’s got this really
long history as an insur-
ance product, broadly
speaking, but the ques-
tion that is of interest to
economists is: Is this
insurance product worth
having around?” 
Bankruptcy is of inter-
est to economists because
it’s supposed to be a safe-
ty net against all the 
hazards of modern-day
life, from divorce to dis-
ability, and the conse-
quences of maintaining
this safety net are not to
be taken lightly. Credit
costs are higher for every-
body because borrowers
always have the option to seek the
sanctuary of bankruptcy court. To
hedge their bets, lenders charge more.
In  theory, economists say that in 
a world where shocks to people’s
income are “transitory” — that is, tem-
porary, surmountable setbacks like
unemployment or brief illnesses —
then it’s hard to justify a role for bank-
ruptcy. In such a world, the costs of
bankruptcy — making borrowing more
expensive for everybody — outweigh
the benefits an average person might
obtain from being able to walk away
from his debts. But those same econo-
mists concur that if income shocks 
are more severe and permanent, bank-
ruptcy makes economic sense. And we
see such shocks all the time: workers
lose limbs in plant accidents; jobless 
mothers divorce and are awarded sole
custody of their children. The ability 
of those people to dig their way out of
debt is forever blunted, and so bank-
ruptcy protection is the best answer.
On top of all this is the potential
role of bankruptcy in fostering
America’s entrepreneurial culture.
Innovators must take risks, both
financially and otherwise, and offering
the option of bankruptcy court is
viewed as an important part of culti-
vating entrepreneurship.
The Richmond Fed’s Athreya puts
it this way: “We agree that bankruptcy
in principle can provide people with 
a type of insurance against certain 
outcomes. It makes them willing to
borrow to tide over bad times. But if
bad times persist, we give them an out
through bankruptcy.”
Until recently, Athreya’s research
had concentrated on the conse-
quences of expanded unsecured credit
combined with lax bankruptcy law.
(He decided that it was a bad 
combination, helping a small number
of poor people at the expense of other
people in a manner that reduced over-
all welfare.) Additionally, he is looking
into the interplay between U.S. social
insurance programs like unemploy-
ment insurance and bankruptcy.
The trick with stigma was figuring
a way to plug it into a mathematical
model. Given that shame isn’t an
observable statistic, like the unem-
ployment rate or the gross domestic
product, it’s quite a neat trick.
Here’s how he did it. First, he looked
at some facts and found that from 1991
to 1997 bankruptcy rates roughly dou-
bled. Next, he took the following actual
data from 1991: bankruptcy filings, the
median level of debt discharged in
bankruptcy, and credit card charge-off
rates. He then constructed a model
designed to capture important factors
influencing bankruptcy — including
stigma — that approximately matched
the 1991 data. Finally, he lowered the
cost of stigma in the model to see what
effects that produced. 
When Athreya lowered the cost of
stigma — as was supposedly happen-
ing in America during the 1990s — he
came up with a bankruptcy rate of 0.18
percent in 1997, a close approximation
to the actual 0.2 percent rate. But the
model yielded results that were way 
off in terms of the level of debt held 
by Americans. In Athreya’s lowered-
stigma model, the median debt-to-
income ratio came out as 0.85 percent.
In reality, it was 50 percent. Why the
difference? In the model, when stigma
falls and bankruptcy rates rise, lending
becomes riskier. So lenders require a
higher return to compensate for the
increased risk. Facing higher interest
rates, consumers become less willing





































Mounting consumer debt spawned big increases in
bankruptcy rates during the 1990s. A Richmond Fed
economist suggests that widely available credit —
more so than falling stigma — was the driver behind
the gains.
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Then Athreya found a better fit. 
He ran the same exercise but kept stig-
ma constant and cranked down the cost
of lending money. Suddenly, actual and
projected figures started matching. 
The projected bankruptcy rate was 
0.19 percent (compared with the actual
0.2 percent) and the median debt-to-
income ratio among filers was 40.3 per-
cent (compared to the actual 50 percent).
Athreya’s interpretation of these
results is that in the first run, where 
stigma is lowered, “it becomes very
expensive to get a loan in this era.” By
contrast, when stigma is held constant
and the cost of issuing loans is reduced,
the numbers start falling in place. “It’s
cheaper for creditors to figure out who
they’re lending to and to figure out
information about their ongoing 
relationships,” Athreya says. “This nar-
rative fits together with a lot more facts
that are observable than the stigma
story does.”
It  also fits with other economic
research. In a recent paper, economist
Wendy Edelberg of the Federal Reserve
Board documented the increase of high-
risk borrowers taken on by creditors in
the 1990s. Edelberg argued that tech-
nology-savvy creditors were able to in
effect partition high-risk debtors from
low-risk debtors by pricing them differ-
ently. In the end, this had the effect of
“democratizing“ credit, or lowering the
cost of borrowing for a large population.
Methodological Questions
Athreya’s research has turned a lot of
heads, but it hasn’t convinced every-
one. White, for one, isn’t so sure that
stigma is dead. “I’m not a simulation
person. I’m not a fan of that approach
particularly,” she says, referring to
Athreya’s model.
“Stigma is still something we don’t
have any direct information about,”
White says. “It’s hard to test very rig-
orously. There’s a limit to what econo-
mists can do.”
Within those limits, however,
White tends to employ regression
models — and therein lies her chief
reservation about Athreya’s research,
which relies on simulation models.
It’s  an ongoing debate among aca-
demics, and it is impossible to say
with any authority which side is right.
In  a nutshell, regression models
use historical, empirical data in which
households react the same way to
market forces. By contrast, simula-
tion models recalibrate household
reactions to new market realities. For
example: In football, historical data
might indicate that lining up in “shot-
gun” formation would be a good idea
all of the time, because in cases when
shotgun has been used in the past the
quarterback is seldom sacked. But in
reality, defenses would adjust to
offenses that always used shotgun
formation, thus rendering the initial
model’s results pointless.
In favor of the regression approach
are unassailable data: Every value
plugged into a regression model is
drawn from observable records. As
such, regression is widely believed to
be the best tool in evaluating big, con-
ceptual problems. But macroecono-
mists in particular consider the econo-
my a miserable natural experiment.
How can you possibly conduct a 
“natural” experiment in which some
10,000 values are fixed but one small
variable is changed? That’s what simu-
lation tries to get around. 
Athreya agrees that economic
inquiries have their limits, but he
remains satisfied with his research.
He thinks it is the closest economists
have come to identifying a value for
stigma. And it advances the debate
about what should be done, if any-
thing, to reform U.S. bankruptcy 
policy. There may be no need, after
all, for the breast-pounding over
America’s declining moral standards.
“It’s hard to figure out what shame
looks like. That is what’s allowed this
story to exist for a long time. It float-
ed in the ether and was hard to pin
down,” he says. “To kill stories like
that you need stories for which every-
thing is observable that fit the facts.”
Of course, the facts remain much in
debate. Athreya, for example, con-
cedes the distinct possibility that
both declining stigma and declining
transaction costs are at play in bank-
ruptcy rates. “I can buy that,” he says.
“But then the task is, how big is the
stigma? Asmall part? Abig part?”
It  takes a model to beat a model,
Athreya says, and he has yet to see a
model that discredits his. But he adds,
“My model is certainly not the last
word on this.” The only shame would
be in letting the inquiry drop. RF
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